When worry about climate change leads to climate action:How values, worry and personal responsibility relate to various climate actions by Bouman, Thijs et al.
 
 
 University of Groningen
When worry about climate change leads to climate action
Bouman, Thijs; Verschoor, Mark; Albers, Casper; Böhm, Gisela; Fisher, Stephen D.;





IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Publication date:
2020
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
Bouman, T., Verschoor, M., Albers, C., Böhm, G., Fisher, S. D., Poortinga, W., Whitmarsh, L., & Steg, L.
(2020). When worry about climate change leads to climate action: How values, worry and personal
responsibility relate to various climate actions. Global Environmental Change, 62, [102061].
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2020.102061
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the
number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.
Download date: 26-12-2020
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Global Environmental Change
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/gloenvcha
When worry about climate change leads to climate action: How values,
worry and personal responsibility relate to various climate actions
Thijs Boumana,⁎, Mark Verschoora, Casper J. Albersa, Gisela Böhmb,c, Stephen D. Fisherd,
Wouter Poortingae,f, Lorraine Whitmarshe, Linda Stega
a Department of Psychology, Faculty of Behavioural and Social Sciences, University of Groningen, Groningen, the Netherlands
bDepartment of Psychosocial Science, Faculty of Psychology, University of Bergen, Bergen, Norway
c Department of Psychology, Inland Norway University of Applied Sciences, Lillehammer, Norway
dDepartment of Sociology, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom
e School of Psychology, Cardiff University, Cardiff, Wales, United Kingdom
fWelsh School of Architecture, Cardiff University, Cardiff, Wales, United Kingdom
A B S T R A C T
The IPCC's report on Global Warming of 1.5°C positioned climate change as one of the most worrying issues mankind has ever faced. Although many people worry
about climate change, there is still much unknown about the origins and outcomes of worry about climate change; particularly, whether and how it can motivate
specific and personal climate actions. The current paper investigates this critical relationship with data from the European Social Survey Round 8 (44,387 respondents
from 23 countries). As expected, the more individuals worried about climate change, the more likely they were to take and support climate action. Yet, the process
through which this association occurred differed between actions. Specifically, worry was both directly and indirectly, via feelings of personal responsibility to
reduce climate change, associated with climate policy support; whereas worry was mostly indirectly associated with personal climate mitigation behaviours, via
personal responsibility. In addition, worry about climate change appears partly rooted in biospheric values (i.e., caring about nature and the environment), and
biospheric values were also clearly, directly and positively related to personal climate mitigation behaviours. The relationships were highly consistent across
countries but varied somewhat in size. The results show how generic feelings about climate change can directly and indirectly affect both climate policy support and
personal climate mitigation behaviours, thereby providing critical insights for science and policy making.
1. Introduction
“Final call to save the world from 'climate catastrophe'”
(McGrath, 2018), “The world stands on the brink of failure”
(Mooney and Dennis, 2018), “Wake Up, World Leaders. The Alarm Is
Deafening” (The New York Times, 2018) headlined the news after the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change released its Global
Warming of 1.5 °C report (2018) that, based on an extensive assessment
of empirical studies from various disciplines, defined climate change as
one of the – if not the – most worrying issues mankind has ever faced.
But does the general public share these worries about climate change?
And can these worries be translated into the climate actions which are
urgently needed to limit climate change's negative impacts
(Carrico et al., 2015; Hackmann et al., 2014; Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change, 2018; Stern et al., 2016)? Although there is some
evidence to support the popular assumption that worry about climate
change can promote more general support for climate policies
(Smith and Leiserowitz, 2014; Van der Linden et al., 2015, 2019), less is
known about climate worry's relationship with individuals’ more
specific and personal climate actions (cf. Van der Linden, 2017). Yet,
such individual climate actions are – like more generic policy support –
urgently needed to reach the ambitious climate targets set by countries
worldwide. Accordingly, the current paper aims to address this gap by
investigating among 44,387 respondents from 23 countries whether
and how worry about climate change may relate to specific actions
aimed at mitigating climate change.
1.1. Worry about climate change
Worry is typically defined as a personal, active and motivational
emotional state that is characterized by the repeated experience of
anxiousness thoughts about a potential negative event (Ricci et al.,
2010), and that is closely related to individuals’ personal goals, pre-
ferences and behaviours (Leiserowitz, 2009; Levy and Guttman, 1976;
Loewenstein et al., 2001; Peters et al., 2006; Smith and
Leiserowitz, 2014; Van der Linden, 2017). Individuals who experience
worry, feel personally bothered about a real or imagined threat, which
often motivates them to deal with the (imagined) threat in question
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(e.g. Szabó and Lovibond, 2002).
Although conceptually related, worry is typically differentiated
from concern, perceived risk and fear. Specifically, worry is considered
more experiential than concern (Leiserowitz, 2009; Smith and
Leiserowitz, 2014; Van der Linden, 2017), less of a cognitive assessment
than perceived risk (Loewenstein et al., 2001; Peters et al., 2006;
Schmiege et al., 2009), and less overwhelming than the more intense
emotion fear (Smith and Leiserowitz, 2014), which makes worry rela-
tively personal and active, and particularly likely to motivate mitigative
actions (Smith and Leiserowitz, 2014; Szabó and Lovibond, 2002;
Van der Linden, 2017, 2019; Weber, 2010), and which is why we
decided to focus on climate worry.
Applied to the context of climate change, worry about climate
change signals that an individual is actively and emotionally engaged
with the topic of climate change and feels personally bothered by its
consequences, making this person seemingly motivated to act upon the
issue. In line with this proposition, different studies and models – such
as the hierarchy of concern model (Van der Linden, 2017) and gateway
belief model (Van der Linden et al., 2015, 2019) – positioned worry
about climate change as a main predictor of climate mitigation beha-
viours and policy support. Indeed, some empirical studies have found
support for the relationship between worry about climate change and
climate action. Yet, these findings are largely limited to support for
abstract climate policies (Smith and Leiserowitz, 2014; Van der Linden
et al., 2019) or for general public action (Van der Linden et al., 2015),
and to our knowledge did not consider whether worry can also motivate
individuals to undertake more specific actions to mitigate climate
change (for a similar argument, see: Van der Linden, 2017).
Different lines of research have suggested that feelings about
something as abstract and global as climate change are unlikely to di-
rectly result in concrete, personal and specific actions. Specifically, the
abstractness and scale of climate change can make worry about climate
change too psychologically distant from – and therefore “incompatible”
with – individual climate actions, which are often more concrete, spe-
cific and personal; thereby, limiting the likelihood that climate worry
will motivate such actions (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1977; Hornsey et al.,
2016; Spence et al., 2012; Trope and Liberman, 2010; Van der
Linden, 2015a). Moreover, the abstractness and scale of climate change
can make it unclear to individuals what they can do themselves and
whether their actions can make a difference (Moser, 2016;
Poortinga et al., 2006; Ricci et al., 2010; Spence et al., 2010; Steg et al.,
2015), making individuals likely to question whether they personally
are the ones who should act (Brügger et al., 2015; Evensen et al., 2018;
Poortinga et al., 2006; Ricci et al., 2010; Spence et al., 2010).
Hence, whereas some studies suggest that worry about climate
change directly relates to comparably abstract actions, such as support
for abstract climate policies and general public action, worry's re-
lationship with more specific climate mitigation actions is less studied
and might be less direct. Specifically, there may be a gap between
feelings of worry about abstract andglobal climate change, and specific
andpersonal climate mitigation actions. Yet, specific and personal cli-
mate actions are needed to reach climate targets, making it critical to
identify whether and how this gap between general worries about cli-
mate change and specific and personal climate actions can be bridged.
1.2. Bridging the gap: the role of personal responsibility to reduce climate
change
1.2.1. From abstract feelings to specific actions: a value-belief-norm
approach
Following the reasoning of the norm activation model (NAM;
Schwartz, 1977) and the value-belief-norm theory (VBN; Stern, 2000),
we argue that feelings of personal responsibility to reduce climate
change can be pivotal in bridging the gap between worry about abstract
and global climate change, and more specific and personal climate
actions. Although not explicitly focusing on worry, the VBN theory
argues that feelings of personal responsibility are key in translating
feelings about abstract goals into more concrete and specific actions
(Stern, 2012, 2000). Specifically, the VBN theory proposes that when a
situation threatens an abstract goal that is an important guideline in the
life of someone personally (i.e., values), and an individual has the
feeling that this threat is caused and can be relieved by their actions,
this individual is likely to feel a personal responsibility to take these
actions (Stern, 2012), which according to the VBN and NAM prompts
individuals to take personal actions to mitigate the threat. This general
process is widely supported across studies, countries and domains, in-
cluding the environmental domain (Fornara et al., 2016;
Hiratsuka et al., 2018; Jakovcevic and Steg, 2013; Nordlund et al.,
2016; Poortinga et al., 2012; e.g., Steg et al., 2005; Ünal et al., 2019).
1.2.2. Applying VBN and NAM processes to worry about climate change
While VBN theory and NAM do not focus on feelings of worry, we
believe their central propositions could explain how worry is relevant
to specific and personal climate actions. As we will discuss in more
detail below, we argue that worry often originates from threats to
personal values that also initiate the VBN process, and that worry is –
due to its origins and unique characteristics – likely to enhance those
feelings of personal responsibility that could motivate specific actions
according to the VBN theory and NAM.
The earlier mentioned definition of worry already described worry
as closely linked to individuals’ personal goals and preferences
(Leiserowitz, 2009; Levy and Guttman, 1976; Loewenstein et al., 2001;
Peters et al., 2006; Smith and Leiserowitz, 2014; Van der Linden, 2017),
which are at a more general level represented by someone's personal
values; that are, overarching personal goals that function as guiding
principles in individuals’ lives (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992;
Schwartz et al., 2012). Individuals seem particularly more likely to
worry when a situation threatens the values they personally endorse
and prioritize. Indeed, research showed that individuals are more likely
to worry about climate change when they endorse and prioritize bio-
spheric values more strongly (Van der Linden, 2015b); that is, when
they strongly and personally care about nature and the environment
(Bouman et al., 2018; Bouman and Steg, 2019; De Groot and
Steg, 2008; Steg and De Groot, 2012; Stern et al., 1998), which are
obviously threatened by climate change. Hence, we propose that an
individual will be particularly likely to worry about climate change
when it threatens something they personally value, such as nature and
the environment, and thus when they strongly endorse biospheric va-
lues.
We argue that because climate worry is closely linked to threats to
the things individuals personally care about the most
(Leiserowitz, 2009; Levy and Guttman, 1976; Loewenstein et al., 2001;
Peters et al., 2006; Smith and Leiserowitz, 2014; Van der Linden, 2017),
individuals will feel particularly personally responsible to take action to
mitigate climate change. More specifically, individuals who worry
about climate change are expected to not only want to address the
negative emotion climate change evokes (i.e., emotion-focused coping),
but also to actively try to reduce the problem itself (i.e., problem-fo-
cused coping), as climate change is negatively affecting the things they
personally value (e.g., biospheric values). This likely sets worry apart
from fear, which appears more likely than worry to result in emotion-
focused coping strategies (Smith and Leiserowitz, 2014), as well as from
concern and risk perception, which lack the personal emotional con-
nection with the topics at stake (Leiserowitz, 2009; Smith and
Leiserowitz, 2014; Van der Linden, 2017), and could potentially explain
why worry is often regarded a relatively active and motivational
emotional state (Leiserowitz, 2009; Levy and Guttman, 1976;
Loewenstein et al., 2001; Peters et al., 2006; Smith and
Leiserowitz, 2014; Van der Linden, 2017) which seems particularly
likely to spark feelings of personal responsibility that motivate specific
and personal climate mitigation actions.
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1.3. Current study
Based on the above, we hypothesize that the more individuals en-
dorse biospheric values, the more likely they are to experience the
personal, active and motivational emotion of worry about climate
change (Hypothesis 1). We also expect that this worry – in turn – en-
hances individuals’ feelings of personal responsibility to reduce climate
change (Hypothesis 2). Whereas worry about climate change may
sometimes directly and positively relate to support for climate policies
(Hypothesis 3a) (Smith and Leiserowitz, 2014; Van der Linden et al.,
2015, 2019; Van der Linden, 2017), we argue that its effects on specific
and personal climate actions is mostly indirect by strengthening feel-
ings of personal responsibility to reduce climate change (Hypothesis
3b). To investigate the robustness and generalizability of our con-
ceptual model (see Fig. 1), we tested across 23 countries how biospheric
values, worry and personal responsibility were related to each other, to
two personal climate mitigation behaviours, and to support for three
specific climate policies.
2. Methods
2.1. The European social survey
We used unique data from a module on climate change and energy
preferences included in Round 8 of the European Social Survey (ESS 8),
in which 44,387 respondents from 22 European countries plus Israel
participated (European Social Survey, 2016). The European Social
Survey is a high-quality cross-national study that uses strict random
probability sampling and an extensive concept-based design process to
ensure measure equivalence, providing a unique opportunity to ro-
bustly test the model in multiple countries at the same time.
ESS 8 consists of a Core Module, focusing on topics such as media
use, social trust, politics, wellbeing, socio demographics, and human
values, which are collected every round. ESS 8 further includes two
Rotating Modules, focusing on ‘Welfare attitudes in a changing Europe:
Solidarities under pressure’ and ‘Public attitudes to climate change,
energy security, and energy preferences’. The Rotating Module on cli-
mate change and energy was of core interest to the current paper. The
questionnaire was developed in English through a two-year design
process, which included extensive testing, piloting and translation by
national teams (Fitzgerald, 2015).
Data were collected through face-to-face interviews, which took
place in respondents’ own homes. Respondents who had not partici-
pated in previous rounds of the ESS and were aged 15 years and over,
were selected by random probability sampling to form cross-sectional
samples representative for the nations of residence. Each participating
country with a population larger than 2 million had to achieve a
minimum effective sample size of 1,500 respondents. Smaller countries
had to achieve a minimum sample of 800 respondents. Data were col-
lected between August 2016 and December 2017, the duration of data
collection within each country varied between two and eight months.
The full questionnaire and other methodological details can be found on
the ESS website (European Social Survey, 2016). The complete ESS
Round 8 dataset is available for download from http://www.
europeansocialsurvey.org, the analyses and procedures followed for




Our model consists of three person-level predictor variables – bio-
spheric values, worry about climate change and feelings of personal re-
sponsibility to reduce climate change – that we hypothesized would relate
to the outcome variables energy-saving behaviours (i.e. climate mitiga-
tion behaviours) and climate policy support (see Fig. 1). Biospheric va-
lues were measured in the core module of the ESS Round 8
(European Social Survey, 2016), and worry about climate change and
feelings of personal responsibility to reduce climate change were
measured in the ‘Rotating Module on climate change and energy’ of the
ESS Round 8 (Poortinga et al., 2018).
Biospheric values. Biospheric values were measured with one item,
which was included in the modified 21-item Portrait Value
Questionnaire (Schwartz, 2003) in the ESS Core Module. The biospheric
item consisted of the following, gender-matched, short two-sentence
description of a person “[She/he] strongly believes that people should
care for nature. Looking after the environment is important to [her/
him].” Respondents were asked to indicate how similar the described
person was to themselves on a 6-point scale (1 very much like me to 6 not
like me at all). For easier interpretation, the item was reversed coded so
that higher scores reflect stronger biospheric values, after which the
grand mean was 4.84 (SD = 1.03; See SI, Table S1, for a full overview
of the country means and standard deviations).
Worry about climate change. Respondents answered the question
“How worried are you about climate change?” on a 5-point scale (1 not
at all worried, 2 not very worried, 3 somewhat worried, 4 very worried, and
5 extremely worried). The grand mean was 3.04 (SD = 0.92; See SI,
Table S1, for a full overview of country means and standard deviations).
Feelings of personal responsibility to reduce climate change.
Respondents indicated on an 11-point scale (0 not at all to 10 a great
deal) “To what extent do you feel a personal responsibility to try to
reduce climate change?”. The grand mean was 5.71 (SD= 2.66; see SI,
Table S1, for a full overview of the country means and standard de-
viations).
Fig. 1. Proposed conceptual model through which biospheric values and worry about climate change relate to personal climate mitigation behaviours and support for
climate policy. Thicker lines represent hypothesized stronger relationships.
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2.2.2. Outcome variables
We included five outcome variables, of which two reflected dif-
ferent types of energy-saving behaviours, and three reflected support
for different climate policies.
Personal energy-saving behaviours. We used two items to mea-
sure energy-saving behaviours. The first reflected energy efficiency be-
haviour: “If you were to buy a large electrical appliance for your home,
how likely is it that you would buy one of the most energy efficient
ones?”. Scores could vary from 1 not at all likely to 10 extremely likely.
The variable had a grand mean of 7.83 (SD= 2.22; see SI, Table S2, for
a full overview of the country means and standard deviations). The
second item reflected energy curtailment behaviour: “There are some
things that can be done to reduce energy use, such as switching off
appliances that are not being used, walking for short journeys, or only
using the heating or air conditioning when really needed. In your daily
life, how often do you do things to reduce your energy use?”. Responses
could vary from 1 never, 2 hardly ever, 3 sometimes, 4 often, 5 very often,
and 6 always. The grand mean was 4.18 (SD = 1.18; see SI, Table S2,
for a full overview of the country means and standard deviations).
Climate policy support. Respondents indicated their support for
three different climate policies on a 5-point scale (1 strongly in favour, 2
somewhat in favour, 3 neither in favour nor against, 4 somewhat against,
and 5 strongly against). For easier interpretation, the items were re-
versed coded so that higher scores reflect stronger support for the cli-
mate policy. The items were “increasing taxes on fossil fuels, such as oil,
gas and coal” (i.e., tax fossil fuels, M = 2.81; SD = 1.23), “using public
money to subsidise renewable energy such as wind and solar power”
(i.e., subsidize renewables, M = 3.97; SD = 1.05), and “a law banning
the sale of the least energy efficient household appliances” (i.e., ban
least energy efficient appliances, M = 3.57; SD= 1.16); the SI (Table S2)
provides a full overview of the country means and standard deviations.
2.3. Data preparation and analyses
All analyses were performed in R Studio, a program based on the R
statistical software. Before running the regression and mediation ana-
lyses, for which we used the R-package lavaan (Rosseel, 2012), we
standardized all variables at the country level to prevent the occurrence
of Yule's (Yule, 1903) and Simpson's (Simpson, 1951) paradoxes, and to
enhance the comparability of effect sizes across variables. We visualized
our results (Figs. 2 to 4) with the R-package ggplot2 (Wickham, 2009).
For some respondents, data were missing on one or multiple vari-
ables of interest to this paper (13.16% of the overall sample). Inspection
of the data indicated that most missing values were caused by the
survey flow. That is, when respondents indicated to not believe in cli-
mate change (2.99% of the overall sample), the items worry about cli-
mate change and personal responsibility to reduce climate change were
regarded as irrelevant for those respondents and were therefore
skipped, resulting in missing values on these items. Other missing data
were caused by respondents not answering a question, refusal to answer
a question, or not knowing what to answer. To appropriately deal with
those missing values, we first inspected the data, after which we com-
pared three different approaches to handle missing data.
Approach 1 relies on the sample containing only those respondents
who answered all questions discussed within this paper (n = 38,546).
We believe this approach best reflects the theorizing behind the survey
– that is, the deliberate choice to not ask questions that presume people
believe in climate change to those individuals who do not believe in
climate change, and to give respondents the opportunity to deliberately
not answer questions – although outcomes of corresponding analyses
may not represent people who deny the existence of climate change (<
3% in current sample).
Approach 2 used a data-driven method of imputation. We used the
R-package mice (Van Buuren and Groothuis-Oudshoorn, 2011) to im-
pute scores for all missing data. These scores were estimated based on
the respondent's scores on all variables of the climate change and
energy module that were not included in the current paper's analyses.
Approach 3 employed an expert-knowledge based method of im-
puting. Specifically, when respondents indicated to not believe in cli-
mate change, and accordingly had missing data on worry and personal
responsibility, we respectively imputed a 1 (not at all worried) and a 0
(not at all [personally responsible]), which were the lowest scores
possible on these scales, assuming respondents who do not believe in
climate change also do not worry about it and do not feel personally
responsible to reduce it. Other missing values were, like Approach 2,
imputed with the R-package mice.
Overall, only very minor differences in outcomes were observed
between the three approaches, which is why we decided to only report
the results of one approach in the main paper; that is, the results of
Approach 1. We selected this approach because we believe it best re-
flected the theorizing behind the study, and results from this approach
only relied on scores directly provided by respondents themselves, in-
stead of also on scores being indirectly inferred from answers on other
questions or theory (and corresponding assumptions). Summaries of the
other approaches’ outcomes are included in the SI (Figure S1 to S4), and
all R code, data tables and plots can be accessed on the Open Science
Framework at.
3. Results
Following our model, we tested the proposed relationships in three
steps, for which we report statistics for the overall sample, as well as for
the 23 separate countries (Figs. 2 to 5).
3.1. Biospheric values, worry about climate change and personal
responsibility
First, we tested the relationships between our model's three pre-
dictor variables biospheric values, worry about climate change, and
feelings of personal responsibility to reduce climate change (see Fig. 1,
β1-3).
As expected (Hypothesis 1), we found that stronger endorsement of
biospheric values related to stronger feelings of worry about climate
change (overall: ^1 = 0.25, SE = .005, 95% CI = 0.24 to 0.26). The
direction of this relationship was consistently positive across all coun-
tries, providing strong support for Hypothesis 1, although effect sizes
varied somewhat (see Fig. 2, blue diamonds, for country-specific betas
and Cis). In general, effect sizes were stronger in Northern-European
countries (e.g., Iceland, Norway) and Western-European countries (e.g.,
France, Germany), and weaker in Eastern-European countries (e.g.,
Lithuania, Russia, Hungary).
We proceeded by testing how worry and biospheric values were
together associated with personal responsibility (see Fig. 1, β2 and β3,
respectively). In line with Hypotheses 2, we found that worry was
strongly positively related to personal responsibility (overall:
^
2 = 0.41, SE= .005, 95% CI = 0.40 to 0.42; controlling for biospheric
values). In general, the more individuals worried about climate change,
the stronger their feelings of personal responsibility to reduce climate
change. The direction of this relationship was consistently positive
across all countries, and only slightly varied in size (see Fig. 2, black
circles, for country-specific betas and CIs), providing strong support for
Hypothesis 2.
The direct relationship between biospheric values and personal re-
sponsibility, for which we did not formulate a hypothesis, was in gen-
eral weakly positive (overall: ^3 = 0.13, SE = .005, 95% CI = 0.12 to
0.14; controlling for worry). When inspecting country-specific coeffi-
cients, we observed that the direction of this relationship was less
consistent across countries than the earlier reported relationships, with
weak negative coefficients in Lithuania and Czech Republic (see Fig. 2,
orange triangles, for country-specific betas and CIs). In general, the
association between biospheric values and personal responsibility was
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strongest in Northern- and Western-European countries, whereas
weaker effects were observed in Eastern-European countries, as well as
in Southern-European countries (e.g., Portugal and Italy).
Mediation analyses with estimates based on 10,000 bootstraps re-
vealed that the relationship between biospheric values and personal
responsibility was (partially) mediated by worry in all countries, with
an overall total effect of +
^
*3 1 2 = 0.23, SE = .005, 95% CI = 0.22 to
0.24. Again, country-specific total effects were generally stronger in
Northern- and Western-European countries, and weaker in Eastern- and
Southern-European countries (see Fig. 2, green squares and CIs).
Overall, these analyses supported our reasoning that worry about
climate change would positively relate to feelings of personal respon-
sibility to reduce climate change (Hypothesis 2), and that biospheric
values would positively relate to worry (Hypothesis 1), and mostly via
worry postively relate to personal responsibility to reduce climate
change. The consistency in which we found support for the hypothe-
sized relationships across all countries, strongly highlights the uni-
versality of our model.
3.2. Personal responsibility, energy-saving behaviours and climate policy
support
Second, we tested the relationship between feelings of personal
responsibility and the outcome variables reflecting energy-saving be-
haviours and climate policy support, respectively (see Fig. 1, β4). As
predicted, personal responsibility to reduce climate change positively
and similarly related to both energy-saving behaviours, as well as
support for the three climate policies, which is in line with our Hy-
pothesis 3b. In general, stronger feelings of personal responsibility were
related to a higher likelihood of purchasing energy efficient household
appliances (overall: R2 = .04, ^4 = 0.20, SE = .006, 95% CI = 0.19 to
0.21) and stronger engagement in energy curtailment behaviours
(overall: R2 = .04, ^4 = 0.20, SE = .006, 95% CI = 0.19 to 0.21), as
well as to being more supportive of fossil fuel taxation (overall:
R2 = .05, ^4 = 0.22, SE = .005, 95% CI = 0.21 to 0.23), subsidizing
renewables (overall: R2 = .04, ^4 = 0.19, SE = .006, 95% CI = 0.18 to
0.20) and banning unsustainable appliances (overall: R2 = .05,
^
4 = 0.21, SE = .005, 95% CI = 0.20 to 0.22). The direction of these
relationships was consistently positive across all studied countries, al-
though effect sizes did vary (see Fig. 3). Specifically, as was also ob-
served for the relationships between biospheric values, worry and
personal responsibility, effect sizes were generally stronger in Northern-
and Western-European countries, and weaker in Eastern- and Southern-
European countries.
3.3. Personal responsibility, biospheric values and worry's association with
climate mitigation behaviours and policy support
Third, we tested the model consisting of all measured potential
antecedents of energy-saving behaviours and policy support by in-
cluding feelings of personal responsibility ( ^4), worry about climate
change (^5) and biospheric values (
^
6). For all outcome variables, this
model clearly explained more variance than the model comprising only
personal responsibility (see Table 1). The standardized beta-coefficients
for each of the five outcome variables are plotted in Fig. 5a for feelings
of personal responsibility to reduce climate change, Fig. 5b for worry
about climate change, and Fig. 5c for biospheric values. Overall, feel-
ings of personal responsibility to reduce climate change, worry about
climate change and biospheric values were positively related to energy-
saving behaviours and climate policy support. Yet, the strength of these
relationships considerably varied across the different outcome vari-
ables.
When controlling for the other predictors, only personal responsi-
bility was similarly related to both energy-saving behaviours and cli-
mate policy support, which was in line with our Hypothesis 3b. In
general, the stronger individuals felt personally responsible to reduce
climate change, the more likely they were to take or support a wide
Fig. 2. Standardized regression coefficients and corresponding 95% confidence intervals for each county for the relationship between biospheric values and worry
( ^1, blue diamonds), worry and personal responsibility (
^
2, black circles), biospheric values and personal responsibility (
^
3, Orange triangles), and the total effect of
biospheric values on personal responsibility (green squares). Countries are ordered based on the strength of the total effect. The four symbols above the horizontal
axis represent the grand mean over all 23 countries. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of
this article.)
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range of specific climate actions. Relationships between personal re-
sponsibility and each of the five individual climate actions were con-
sistently positive in most countries. Again, stronger effects were ob-
served in Northern- and Western-European countries, and weaker
effects were observed in Southern- and Eastern-European countries (see
Fig. 5a).
When taking the other predictors into account, biospheric values
were overall relatively strongly and positively related to the two en-
ergy-saving behaviours, and this relationship was consistently positive
across all countries. Hence, stronger endorsement of biospheric values
was associated with stronger engagement in climate mitigation beha-
viours. Biospheric values’ relationship with climate policy support was
Fig. 3. Standardized regression coefficients for each country for the relationship between personal responsibility and the outcomes variables energy efficiency
behaviour (black), energy curtailment behaviour (orange), support for tax on fossil fuels (green), support for subsidizing renewables (yellow), and support for law
banning energy inefficient products (blue). Countries are ordered based on the strength of the overall relationship. (For interpretation of the references to colour in
this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
Fig. 4. Map displaying the average effect of personal responsibility to reduce climate change on energy saving behaviours and climate policy support. Darker shades
indicate stronger effect sizes.
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weaker, but overall still positive. This relationship was much less con-
sistent across countries, and significantly negative in some countries
(see Fig. 5c). Notably, biospheric values were relatively strongly nega-
tively related to support for fossil fuel taxation in Hungary, which de-
viated from all other observed relationships between biospheric values
and individual climate actions.
When taking the other predictor variables into account, worry about
climate change was overall positively related to climate policy support,
which supports Hypothesis 3a, but was only weakly positively related
to personal energy-saving behaviours, which was also expected be-
forehand. Hence, higher levels of worry about climate change were
overall directly associated with enhanced policy support, and less so
with climate mitigation behaviours. In most countries worry's associa-
tions with support for specific climate policies were positive, whereas
the direction of the relationships between worry and climate mitigation
behaviours appeared more inconsistent (see Fig. 5b).
4. Discussion
Our findings offer clear support for the proposition that worry about
climate change can play an important role in motivating individuals to
support specific climate policies and to undertake personal behaviours
to mitigate climate change. Specifically, in line with our Hypothesis 3a
and previous research (Smith and Leiserowitz, 2014; Van der Linden
et al., 2015, 2019; Van der Linden, 2017), we observed an unique, di-
rect and positive relationship between worry about climate change and
climate policy support across most countries: individuals who worried
more about climate change were more likely to support climate po-
licies. Moreover, our findings also supported our newly proposed in-
direct pathway through which worry about climate change may link to
a wider range of specific and personal climate actions. Specifically,
worry was positively related to feelings of personal responsibility to
reduce climate change (Hypothesis 2), which, in turn, also linked to
climate policy support, as well as to personal climate mitigation be-
haviours (Hypothesis 3b), to which worry was only weakly, and less
consistently, directly positively related. Thereby, our findings provide
new and critical insights in the direct and indirect pathways through
which worry about climate change relates to individuals’ engagement
in different forms of climate action, which is urgently needed to reach
the ambitious climate targets set by many countries across the world
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2018).
Importantly, next to providing insights in the potential
Table 1
Regression of energy-saving behaviours and climate policy support on biospheric values, personal responsibility and worry about climate change (CC) across
countries.








Energy efficiency .08 .13 [.12, .14] .05 [.04, .06] .19 [.18, .20]
Energy curtailment .09 .12 [.11, .13] .08 [.07, .09] .21 [.20, .22]
Tax fossil fuels .06 .17 [.16, .18] .10 [.09, .11] .03 [.02, .04]
Subsidize renewables .06 .12 [.11, .13] .10 [.09, .11] .10 [.09, .11]
Ban unsustainable appliances .07 .14 [.13, .15] .12 [.11, .13] .11 [.10, .12]
Note. Betas refer to Fig. 1.
Fig. 5. Standardized regression coefficients for each country for the relationship between personal responsibility to reduce climate change (A), worry about climate
change (B), biospheric values (C) and the outcomes variables energy efficiency behaviour (black), energy curtailment behaviour (orange), support for tax on fossil
fuels (green), support for subsidizing renewables (yellow), and support for law banning energy inefficient products (blue). Countries are ordered based on the
strength of the overall relationship. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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consequences of worry about climate change, our data also offer key
insights into the origins of worry about climate change. In line with the
definition of worry (Leiserowitz, 2009; Levy and Guttman, 1976;
Loewenstein et al., 2001; Peters et al., 2006; Smith and
Leiserowitz, 2014; Van der Linden, 2017) and our Hypothesis 1, worry
about climate change was strongly related to individuals’ personal goals
and preferences, here represented by individuals’ personal biospheric
values. That is, the more individuals cared about nature and the en-
vironment (i.e., biospheric values), the more likely they were to worry
about climate change. In addition, biospheric values were also directly,
positively and uniquely related to personal climate mitigation beha-
viours, but less to climate policy support. These findings are important
as they may indicate what individuals perceive to be threatened by
climate change (e.g., nature and the environment), thereby providing a
better understanding of individuals’ climate-related beliefs and feelings,
and offering directions on what outcomes climate policies and inter-
ventions could communicate and target as to increase public support.
4.1. Theoretical implications
Our findings are relevant for – and extend – various lines of re-
search. Whereas the observed direct relationship between worry about
climate change and climate policy support replicates initial findings on
the gateway belief model (Van der Linden et al., 2015, 2019), our data
also suggests that worry's impact on climate actions – particularly
personal climate mitigation behaviours – may be less direct than as-
sumed by this model. Specifically, our findings showed that personal
responsibility to reduce climate change may be key in translating ab-
stract worries into more concrete and personal climate mitigation be-
haviours, which is in line with and extends reasoning from the VBN
theory (Steg et al., 2005; Stern, 2000; Ünal et al., 2019) and the prin-
ciple of compatibility, which maintains that predictors should be at a
similar level of abstractness as the behaviour being predicted
(Ajzen and Fishbein, 1977). Moreover, our findings suggest that worry
about climate change may be rooted in individuals’ personal biospheric
values, potentially adding a predictor to the gateway belief model, and
showing another parallel with the VBN theory.
Overall, our results could be interpreted as support for a novel
value-emotion-norm (VEN) pathway to climate action, which might
occur next to the commonly used VBN pathway which focuses more on
cognitions than emotions. Importantly, this could mean that individuals
not only feel personally responsible to take action when they perceive
themselves as playing a role in causing the problem, as is proposed in
the VBN, but that such feelings of personal responsibility might also
arise from how the issue affects them emotionally, specifically when
they worry about it. Indeed, different lines of research suggest that
emotions can play an important – and sometimes even more important
role than cognitions – in motivating individuals to act (Chapman et al.,
2017; Marlon et al., 2019; Moser, 2016; Pfister and Böhm, 2008;
Taufik et al., 2016). Future studies could test these propositions.
4.2. Unique effects of values, worry and personal responsibility on different
climate actions
The observation that climate policy support and climate mitigation
behaviours were differently associated with our predictor variables
personal responsibility, worry about climate change and biospheric
values, indicate that different processes may underlie different types of
climate actions. This has important implications for research on climate
action, suggesting that existing theory to explain or promote one spe-
cific climate action (e.g., climate mitigation behaviours) may not fully
generalize to other climate actions (e.g., climate policy support), even
though both actions are aimed at achieving the same goal (i.e., to mi-
tigate climate change). Importantly, the observed relationships may
also be indicative for how individuals perceive specific climate actions
and offer insights in the meaning of specific variables (e.g., biospheric
values, worry about climate change) to people, which we will discuss
below.
Specifically, the relatively strong direct and indirect link between
climate mitigation behaviours and biospheric values signify the per-
sonal nature of these actions. Biospheric values indicate how much
someone personally cares about nature and the environment
(Schwartz and Butenko, 2014; Steg et al., 2014; Stern and Dietz, 1994),
which appear particularly guiding in how individuals want to live their
lives themselves, as reflected in their individual climate mitigation be-
haviours. Furthermore, the unique relationship between biospheric
values and personal climate mitigation behaviours supports that the
scope of biospheric values is broader than climate change alone. Bio-
spheric values may therefore provide an additional reason to engage in
(pro-environmental) climate mitigation actions, next to climate-specific
feelings of personal responsibility to reduce climate change. These
findings imply that to promote personal climate mitigation behaviours,
it is important to make these actions relevant for – and benefit – the key
values individuals personally endorse, in particular biospheric
(Bouman and Steg, 2020, 2019).
Compared to values, worry about climate change seems more pro-
blem focused. The focus is on reducing the global problem of climate
change, which requires individuals to collectively change their beha-
viours around the world. Climate policies, which typically have society-
wide implications, maybe more likely than individual actions to achieve
such collective changes, which could explain why worry is mostly as-
sociated with climate policy support. Moreover, worry's unique link
with climate policy support indicates that worry may provide other
motivations to support climate policies than feeling personally re-
sponsible to do so. Possibly, people support climate policies not only
because they regard it their own responsibility, but also because they
see climate mitigation as others’ responsibility. This would imply that
whereas values mainly prescribe individuals to engage in climate ac-
tions themselves, feelings of worry also makes individuals prescribe
climate actions to others.
Whereas biospheric values and worry about climate change seem to
primarily relate to respectively personal actions or policy support,
personal responsibility to reduce climate change was in similar ways
uniquely, positively and directly related to both types of climate ac-
tions. The observation that personal responsibility to reduce climate
change related to a wider range of climate actions could be explained
by its roots in both worry and biospheric values, which might widen
individuals’ scope on what climate actions could be taken. Moreover, as
proposed in the VBN and NAM, feelings of personal responsibility to act
are conceptually strongly connected to actual actions (Schwartz, 1977;
Stern, 2000), making personal responsibility a key predictor of a wide
range of actions (Van Der Werff and Steg, 2016, 2015).
The notion that a wide variety of climate actions is associated with
personal responsibility to reduce climate change is critical given that
effects of general predictors – such as values, worry and personal re-
sponsibility – on single actions are typically small of size, and that the
main value of such predictors largely lays in the range of actions it can
predict, which together can add-up into a large overall effect (Van Der
Werff and Steg, 2016, 2015). Indeed, the observed effects were all small
to medium of size, suggesting the main strength of our model – and
particularly the role of personal responsibility to reduce climate change
– lays in predicting a multitude of actions and policy preferences rather
than predicting one action extremely well. This may be particularly
critical in situations like climate change, which require a wide variety
of actions, at both the individual and societal level
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2018).
4.3. Consistent effects, different effect sizes, across countries
Importantly, we found strong support for our proposed model in all
countries. That is, in all countries the process variables in our model
(i.e., biospheric values, worry about climate change, personal
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responsibility to reduce climate change) consistently related to each
other, and to almost all climate actions, in the hypothesized ways.
These insights are particularly valuable given that they were found in a
large sample consisting of 23 countries, in which the exact same mea-
sures and methodologies were used. Hence, the consistency of our ob-
servations thereby strongly supports the validity and robustness of our
model and findings, and clearly advances scientific understanding on
the antecedents of climate action, and therefore contributes to inter-
national climate policy and, in particular, the development of interna-
tional climate strategies.
Yet, while effects were consistently in the hypothesized direction,
there were some differences in terms of the size of the effects. When
focusing on the relationships between the model's process variables,
biospheric values were comparatively strongly associated with climate
worry and personal responsibility in most Northern- and Western-
European countries, while relatively weak associations were observed
in most Eastern- and Southern-European countries. Although cross-
country differences in the model effects were not the primary focus of
the current paper, they could provide insights into the conditions under
which biospheric values, worry, and personal responsibility relate to
each other. Accordingly, future research could explore these differences
in effect sizes further. It is, for example, possible that the observed
differences can be explained by the extent to which climate change is
considered primarily a threat to nature and the environment, which
connects biospheric values to climate change (cf. Ponizovskiy et al.,
2019). Specifically, in comparison to Northern- and Western-European
countries, the association between biospheric values and climate-re-
lated feelings might be weaker among Eastern-European countries be-
cause they are generally more sceptical about climate change and its
impacts (e.g. Poortinga et al., 2018), and might therefore be less likely
to perceive threats of climate change to nature and the environment.
Moreover, the relatively weak association between biospheric values
and climate-related feelings in Southern-European countries could po-
tentially be explained by what consequences of climate change are
focal. These countries might be primarily bothered by climate change's
disruptive impacts on society (rather than nature) as they more likely
face such issues than other European countries due to more extreme
weather conditions (e.g., droughts, floods) and limited means to ef-
fectively adapt to it (European Environment Agency, 2015).
The hypothesized positive relationship between personal responsi-
bility and specific climate actions was also consistently supported
across countries but appeared variable in size as well. Again, effect sizes
were often larger in Northern- and Western-European countries, and
weaker in Eastern- and Southern-European countries. Following the
reasoning of the previous paragraph, these differences could be ex-
plained by what origins and impacts climate change is perceived to
have and, accordingly, which actions are perceived most necessary and
effective. Specifically, if individuals do not perceive the presented
measures to result in desired outcomes (e.g., not targeting the cause,
not affecting the primary issue), feelings of personal responsibility to
reduce climate change unlikely motivate engagement in such actions.
Furthermore, country-level factors, such as wealth or fossil fuel de-
pendency could play a role (Demski et al., 2018; European Environment
Agency, 2017; International Energy Agency, 2018; Poortinga et al.,
2019). For example, it might on average be easier for Northern and
Western Europeans to translate their feelings of personal responsibility
into action as they often are less financially burdened by climate action
(e.g., because of higher income), are presented with more concrete and
better sustainable alternatives (e.g., energy from renewable sources),
and receive more support (e.g., by governments or energy companies).
Critically, these disparities may further increase over time, as higher
uptake of options is often associated with decreasing costs, and in-
creases in perceived efficacy and social support (Bouman and
Steg, 2019; Steg et al., 2005; Stern, 2000), which could widen the gap
and may therefore be key to target at EU-policy level.
Worry and biospheric values were also uniquely positively related to
climate actions in most countries, but overall these relationships ap-
peared weaker and less consistent, which we beforehand already as-
sumed would be the case (Fig. 1, β5 and β6). Some of our analyses even
seemed to suggest that in some countries worry and/or biospheric va-
lues were negatively associated with one or two climate actions (Fig. 5),
in particular support for fossil fuel taxation. Yet, most of these negative
relationships only occurred when we controlled for the other predictor
variables, while these relationships were close to zero or positive when
simple bivariate correlations were inspected. Given the large number of
relationships tested (3 predictor variables, 5 outcome variables, across
23 countries), it is not unlikely that some deviations or unexpected
findings have occurred simply by chance. Accordingly, no strong con-
clusions should be drawn from these exceptions, though future research
could investigate these relationships further.
Overall, our findings show the universality of our proposed model.
The examined country-specific relationships are almost all in the hy-
pothesized direction, and only vary somewhat in size. This highlights
the usefulness of psychological models to explain climate action across
different contexts, but also the relevance of conducting cross-cultural
research, using high-quality datasets such as the European Social
Survey to identify and understand differences where they may occur.
Specifically, whereas the observed directions of the relationships be-
tween variables strongly conformed to our hypotheses and were highly
consistent across countries, effect sizes varied between countries, sug-
gesting that country- and region-level factors may moderate the hy-
pothesized relationships. Critically, the list of moderators we have
discussed in this section is not exhaustive, and further theorizing and
testing is required to draw firm conclusions on the proposed mod-
erators’ effects.
4.4. Unanticipated findings, future directions and potential limitations
This research produced a few findings that were not a-priori
theorised. For example, we found relatively strong direct relationships
between biospheric values and personal climate mitigation behaviours.
Whereas we already provided a justification as to why biospheric values
might not only be related to (pro-environmental) climate actions via
climate-related feelings, future research could investigate further pro-
cesses through which biospheric values and climate actions are asso-
ciated. It is possible that other climate-related factors (e.g. efficacy
beliefs), or environmental factors (e.g. environmental self-identity)
(Gatersleben et al., 2014; Van Der Werff et al., 2014; Van Der Werff and
Steg, 2016) explain how values translate into climate action, which may
be key to promote climate actions in relatively climate sceptical
countries. Similarly, the direct relationship between worry about cli-
mate change and climate policy support deserves further investigation,
in which a feeling that others (e.g., other citizens, companies or gov-
ernments), next to oneself, are responsible for taking action may be a
key mediator. Specifically, individuals who worry about climate change
may be likely to perceive climate action as a joint responsibility, as only
through joint efforts the climate change they worry about can be re-
duced. These feelings of joint responsibility may, in turn, be a key
predictor of support for climate policies with society-wide implications.
Another promising avenue for future research would be to expand
the model with other climate-relevant emotions (Nabi et al., 2018;
Smith and Leiserowitz, 2014), such as hope, and explore whether our
proposed process or other processes could lead these emotions to turn
into actions. For example, as indicated in the introduction, we would
expect concern to be less associated with personal actions than worry,
as it appears less experiential and personal (Leiserowitz, 2009;
Smith and Leiserowitz, 2014; Van der Linden, 2017). Yet, concern
might relate similarly as worry to more pragmatic and collective re-
sponses, such as climate policy support or support for public action. In
addition, it would be interesting to research how more positive and
constructive emotions – such as hope, pride and happiness
(Marlon et al., 2019; Smith and Leiserowitz, 2014; Taufik et al., 2016;
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Venhoeven et al., 2016) – can promote personal actions, and whether
similar processes play a role for these emotions.
Future research could also address some of the potential weaknesses
of the current study. Whereas our model infers causal relationships
between variables from theory, our data are correlational; meaning that
future research is needed to confirm the theorized directions of the
relationships. Moreover, the way in which the data were collected
(large scale, international, high-level) restricted the number of items we
could use to measure relevant constructs, potentially limiting their re-
liability. Although this might have had small effects on our outcomes,
most likely weakening them due to unintended answering tendencies,
we do believe that the consistency of the observed relationships be-
tween predictor and various outcome variables across countries (and
languages) supports the usability of the items, and the validity and
reliability of the results presented.
5. Conclusion
In conclusion, we believe the most significant contribution of our
paper lies in the consistency in which our model predicts a wide range
of climate actions and policy preferences across countries. These simi-
larities may be critical for international climate policy, offering insights
in which variables could be targeted at a more global level to promote
wide-scale changes in climate action and policy support. More con-
cretely, in order to change an unprecedented range of behaviours and
preferences – as was recently deemed necessary by the IPCC (2018) – it
seems critical to raise feelings of personal responsibility to reduce cli-
mate change. This can be done directly (e.g., by highlighting in-
dividuals’ role and responsibilities within climate mitigation), but also
indirectly via worry about climate change and biospheric values, which
might have additional direct influences on climate policy support or
climate actions, respectively.
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